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Abstract
This paper uses quantitative balance sheet liquidity analysis, based upon modified ver-
sions of the BCBS 1 and Moody’s 2 models, to provide indicators which would alarm the
UK banks’ short and long-term liquidity positions respectively. These information will
also underpin other research related liquidity risk to banks’ lending and performance. Our
framework accurately reflect UK banks’ liquidity positions under both normal and stress
scenarios based on the consistent accounting information under IFRS. It has significant
contribution on Basel III liquidity ratios calculation. The study also presents fundamental
financial information to facilitate analysis of banks’ business models and funding strategies.
Using data for the period 2005-2010, we provide evidence that there have been variable liq-
uidity strains across the UK banks in our sample. The estimated results show that Barclays
Bank was the only bank to maintain a healthy short-term liquidity position throughout the
sample period; while HSBC remained liquid in the short term, in both normal and stress
conditions, except in 2008 and 2010. RBS, meanwhile, maintained healthy long-term liq-
uidity positions from 2008 after receiving government injections of capital. And Santander
UK was also able to post healthy long-term liquidity positions, except in 2009. However,
the other four banks, the Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, Natwest, and Standard Chartered,
proved illiquid, on both a short-term and long-term basis, throughout the six-year period,
with Natwest being by far the worst performer.
Keywords: UK Balance Sheet Analysis, Liquidity Coverage, Net Cash Capital
1 Introduction
Liquidity represents the ability to fund all contractual obligations of the bank, notably lending
and investment commitments and deposit withdrawals and liability maturates, in the normal
course of business, that is the ability to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they
come due. Therefore, the capability of a bank to fulfill payment obligations as they occur
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determines the short-term liquidity of the bank. The capacity to borrow sufficient long-term
funds at reasonable cost present the long-term liquidity of the bank. The level of permanent
tradablity of capital market products without undue price concessions also affect the liquidity
of the bank to generate cash. The willingness of the market to turn marketable assets into
cash or provide funding again determine the liquidity of the bank.
Even though Basel II3 required regulators and banks to adopt an improved framework for
dealing with liquidity risk, the measurement and management of bank liquidity risk did not
receive adequate attention. Before the latest banking crisis, the liquidity regimes in the UK had
not been fundamentally changed since the early 1980s. According to the Sterling Stock regime
applied to large UK retail banks4, these banks were encouraged to just focus on controlling
intra-day or weekly liquidity, ignoring wider liqudity issues which became apparent during the
recent crisis-notably, the growing dependence on volatile wholesale funding. While the limits
applied to the ‘cumulative net mismatched position’ of the remaining banks likewise failed
to address key liquidity concerns. Accordingly, as recogised in Basel III1, there was a need
for a thorough overhaul of liquidity risk management and assesment. Regulators now argue
that liquidity regulation and supervision should be recognized as being of equal importance
to capital regulation. Indeed, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) was one of the first
national banking regulators to propose the adoption of a new liquidity regime (see FSA5–8), just
after the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision announced principles for sound liquidity
risk management and supervision in September 2008 BCBS 9 .
This paper applies quantitative balance sheet liquidity analysis to measure short-term and
long-term liquidity positions for UK banks. Liquidity risk can arise on both sides of the balance
sheet, if either the liquidity generated from selling assets or the liquidity available from various
funding sources is insufficient to meet obligations as they fall due. In most cases, a trigger
event exposes the existing vulnerability in a bank’s balance sheet and causes an adverse liquidity
outcome. The most common sources of bank vulnerability lie in maturity mismatches between
assets and liabilities, with assets typically being less liquid than liabilities, and significant short
options of the bank with respect to counterparties and customers, such as the right of holders
of sight deposits to withdraw them at any time, or the right of providers of short-term money
market financing not to roll over that funding at the end of the contract.
The first contribution on this paper is successfully measuring a bank’s short-term and
long-term liquidity position using a single number (‘liquidity coverage’ or ‘net cash capital’,
respectively). As they are calculated using balance sheet information according to different
time scales, these numbers are more accurate than more commonly used ‘liquidity ratios’,
such as the deposits-to-assets ratio10 or the loans-to-deposits ratio11, as measures of a bank’s
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liquidity position.
The second contribution of this paper is to take a comprehensive look at the UK banks’
consolidated balance sheet information. This analytical framework provides valuable opera-
tional information, such as a bank’s funding strategy and business model, for external agencies
and regulators to analyze. This research also provides indicators which would alarm the banks
in terms of short-term and long-term liquidity risks. These information will also underpin
other research related liquidity risk to banks’ lending and performance.
The third contribution of this paper explains why the previous intra-day or one week
liquidity focus no longer ensures a bank can survive an unexpected, serious systemic bank
crisis, such as that which caused the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 200812.
We analyze eight UK banks’ liquidity positions from 2005 to 2010 using consistent financial
reporting information. Most primary accounting data is taken from the Bankscope database,
with secondary data being collected from each bank’s financial reports.
The results show that, in these six years, only Barclays Bank kept adequate short-term
liquidity positions throughout, although the HSBC Bank also remained liquid on a short-
term basis, except in 2008 and 2010. Meanwhile, Santander UK was able to cover illiquid
assets and securities using long-term funding except in 2009; and, after receiving a huge equity
injection from the UK government, RBS also managed to maintain adequate long-term liquidity
positions after 2008. In contrast, the rest of the sampled banks failed to manage their internal
liquidity risks properly, exposing themselves to both short-term and long-term illiquidity over
the six year period.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 outlines the methodologies adopted. Section 5 presents the
results. And section 6 summarises and concludes.
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2 Literature Review
As Allen and Gale 13 , Diamond and Rajan 14 , and Freixas and Rochet 15 mentioned, banks are
inherently fragile. This fragility arises because banks provide liquidity by financing themselves
with external funding. Song and Thakor 16 argued that various funding sources create risk for
the bank owing to unanticipated withdrawals that may be precipitated by adverse expectations
of creditors about the bank’s payoffs17 due to economic shocks18 or perceived potential bank
portfolio risk19. Hence, a bank’s liquidity stress might be diminished by both reducing its
risk-taking on the asset side and extending stable funding on the liability side. Inability of
realizing flows would render the financial entity illiquid. In order to assess a bank’s liquidity
position accurately, it is essential to take a comprehensive look at the bank’s consolidated
balance sheet information to examine where banks invest and how they fund themselves rather
than to evaluate simple liquidity ratios, such as the ratio of cash and balances with the central
bank plus securities over total assets10 and the loans-to-deposits ratio11.
The balance sheet liquidity analysis differentiates between different balance sheet items
on both the assets side and the liabilities side, depending on whether the assets are liquid or
illiquid, and whether their funding is stable or volatile respectively20. Under this approach,
a bank liquid in the short term would have enough liquid assets to cover volatile short-term
liabilities, while a bank liquid in the long term would have enough stable long-term funding to
cover sticky illiquid assets (see Table 1).
Table 1: Balance sheet liquidity analysis
Assets Liabilities
Cash and deposits with central bank Short term unsecured bank deposits
Trading assets Trading liabilities
Liquid securities Current portion of long term debt
Repos (and security borrowing) Repos (and security lending)
Illiquid assets Non-bank deposits
Illiquid securities Certified liabilities
Equity
Source: Neu 20 , page 19.
2.1 Short-term Liquidity Framework
Fitch 21 , like other credit rating agencies, uses a short-standing liquidity framework to analyze
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whether an institution is in the potentially vulnerable position of having insufficient liquid
assets or contingency funding to cover short-term debt. Fitch 21 assumes that a bank will not
be able to use long-term funding to maintain short-term solvency, and it focuses on short-term
‘liquidity coverage’, which is the difference between the liquidity pool (a pool of liquid assets)
and stress scenario cash outflows, as follows:
Liquidity coverage = Liquidity pool− Cash outflows.
A positive figure indicates that the bank would be able to maintain liquidity even with a
temporary idiosyncratic or market-wide shock. However, a negative figure means that a bank
may be seriously weakened by a disruption of funding capacity, and will need to access other
funding facilities to maintain its core business franchise.
Fitch 21 defines the liquidity pool to include cash, unencumbered assets, government secu-
rities, liquid financial assets at fair value, and committed un-drawn lines of credit. The cash
outflows come from short-term unsecured debt, brokered deposits, retail deposits, wholesale
deposits, collateralized financing, payables and other liabilities, trading liabilities, and com-
mitments to extend credit. To ensure prudence, Fitch 21 applies different ‘shrinkage margins’
on the possible sources of cash outflow, as shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Shrinkage margins for short-term funding imposed by Fitch
Assumed Shrinkage
Margins
Cash Outflows
100% Short-term unsecured debt
25% Brokered/internet deposits
10% Retail deposits
50% Wholesale deposits
25% Payables and other liabilities
25% Trading liabilities
10% Collateralized financing
25% Commitments to extend credit
Source: Fitch 21 .
Fitch 21 characterizes balance sheet positions only as ‘liquid’ or ‘illiquid’. There are no
statements about in which time frame positions can be liquidated or liabilities become due. In
particular, management cannot know from this analysis whether cash outflows becoming due
within, say, the next eight days can be met. If the time to maturity of a retail deposit is eight
days, it cannot truly be considered as a retail deposit attracting a 10% shrinkage margin.
Learning from the serious financial crisis of 2007-2009, the FSA began overhauling the
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supervision of bank liquidity risk after August 200822. FSA 8 sets out a new liquidity reporting
regime, a part of the overhaul of UK liquidity regulation, which took effect after June 2010,
which requires individual banks to collect daily flows out to three months (i.e. 90 days) to
analyze survival periods and spot potential liquidity squeezes early23. BCBS 1 develops the
liquidity coverage standard for supervisors to use to measure whether a bank makes realistic
assumptions about its future liquidity needs for the short-term that reflect the complexities
of its underlying business, products and markets. This standard aims to ensure that a bank
maintains an adequate level of unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets that can be converted
into cash to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day time horizon under a significantly
severe liquidity stress scenario specified by supervisors. At a minimum, the stock of liquid
assets should enable the bank to survive until Day 30 of the stress scenario.
The Basel liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) builds on traditional ‘liquidity coverage ratio’
methodologies used internally by banks to assess exposure to contingent liquidity events. As
defined,
LCR =
Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days
≥ 100%.
There are two categories of assets comprising the stock of high-quality liquidity assets,
namely ‘Level 1’ assets and ‘Level 2’ assets24. Assets to be included in each category are those
that the bank is holding for a month. Level 1 assets can comprise an unlimited share of the
pool and are not subject to any discount under the LCR. Level 2 assets can be inluded in the
stock of liquid assets subject to the requirement that they comprise no more than 40% of the
overall stock after an assumed weight (85%) has been applied.
Cash outflows come from retail deposits, unsecured wholesale funding provided by small
business customers, unsecured wholesale funding with operational relationships, unsecured
wholesale funding provided by non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks and public
sector entities, unsecured wholesale funding provided by other legal entity customers, and
secured funding. Table 3 sets out the weights imposed by the Basel Committee for each
type of liability, based on the assumptions about the likely speed of cash outflow over the
next 30 calendar stressed days. These stress scenarios include bank-specific scenarios, such as
an unexpected rating downgrade and operational problems, and external scenarios, such as
Emerging Market crises, payment system disruption and macroeconomic shocks.
However, BCBS 1 faces the same problem as Fitch 21 because of having a uniform weight
for a group of liabilities without considering the real contractual maturities. If the time to
maturity of a type of secured funding is less than one week, for example, it should not really
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attract a weight of only 25%.
Table 3: Weights imposed under the Basel Committee’s liquidity coverage ratio
Stock of high-quality liquid assets Assumed
Weight
Cash and central bank reserves 100%
Level 1 assets at 1 month 100%
Level 2 assets at 1 month 85%
Total stock of high-quality liquid assets
Cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days Assumed
Weight
Stable deposits 5%
Less stable deposits 10%
Unsecured wholesale funding provided by small business customers 5-10%
Unsecured wholesale funding with operational relationships 25%
Unsecured wholesale funding provided by non-financial corporates,
sovereigns, central banks and public sector entities
75%
Unsecured wholesale funding provided by other legal entity customers 100%
Secured funding 25%
Total cash outflows
Surplus/deficit
Source: BCBS 1 .
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2.2 Long-term Liquidity Framework
Moody’s 2 has developed a long-standing liquidity framework to determine whether a bank’s
long-term funding is greater than its illiquid assets. Moody’s assume that the bank will not
be able to roll over its short-term funding or to sell its liquid assets to maintain long-term
solvency. Besides assuming no new short-term funding for a bank, the liquidation of business
by a bank cannot be viewed as a prudent alternative liquidity plan. Raffis 25 points out that
the virtue of the tool is that it provides a bank with a consistent and externally-accepted
framework to quantify, analyze, and then report its liquidity position to rating agencies and
regulatory analysts.
Moody’s 2 identifies that ‘net cash capital’ is the balance after deducting illiquid assets and
illiquid securities from long-term funding, as follows:
Net cash capital = Long-term funding− Illiquid assets− Illiquid securities.
A positive figure indicates that the bank would be able to continue operating from its currently
available resources, even with a temporary disruption in the unsecured wholesale funding
markets. However, a negative figure means the bank is in a challenging position, requiring it
to unwind its liquid assets or secure access to the central bank’s liquidity facility in order to
maintain its core business franchise.
Moody’s 2 defines long-term funding to include hybrid capital securities, long term debt, and
insured deposits that are not brokered; while the illiquid assets include fixed assets, intangibles,
loans excluding residential mortgages (because of their marketability, only 20% of the value of
the latter is deemed illiquid), and other assets. Moody’s 2 gives no credit to a bank which can
generate cash from credit cards or other securitizations except residential mortgages. But it
excludes loans and advances to banks from illiquid assets in that these funds can be replaced
quickly by funding elsewhere within the banking system. However, following the sub-prime
crisis of 2007, which created uncertainty about the scale and location of associated losses, and,
more recently, the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which created similar uncertainty, banks
refused to lend to each other as they hoarded liquidity. Therefore, in the light of recent crises,
interbank loans should not be considered as liquid assets under stress scenarios.
Because of the potential default risk, a part of available-for-sale financial investments should
also be considered as illiquid securities. Table 4 lists the weights, allowing for haircuts, imposed
on such securities by Moody’s 2 . These weights are based on feedback from market participants.
In the future, it may be necessary to change the weights in response to any change in market
appetite.
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Table 4: Investment securities’ weights imposed by Moody’s
Available-for-sale financial investments Liquid
Weights
Illiquid
Weights
MBS or ABS without government sponsorship, credit card
receivables, home equity loans, automobile loans, other cus-
tomer loans, commercial and industrial loans
0% 100%
MBS with government sponsorship 90% 10%
Other debt securities including foreign debt 67% 33%
Equity Securities 85% 15%
Treasury securities,government and central bank-sponsored
securities
98% 2%
Source: Moody’s 2
However, there is still no statement from Moody’s 2 about the time scale in which the
long-term funding can be liquidated or become due. Even senior debt is generally considered
as long-term debt, although it cannot be considered long-term funding if the time to maturity
of it is eight days.
BCBS 1 also develops the ‘net stable funding’ standard for supervisors to use to measure
whether a bank makes realistic assumptions about its future liquidity needs for the long-term
that reflect the complexities of its underlying business, products and markets. The Basel
liquidity requirements are also designed to reinforce other supervisory efforts by promoting
structural changes in the liquidity risk profiles of institutions away from short-term funding
and toward more stable, longer-term funding of assets and business activities.
To promote more medium and long-term funding of the assets and activities of banking
organizations, the Committee has developed the concept of a net stable funding ratio (NSFR).
The NSFR builds on traditional ‘net liquid asset’ and ‘cash capital’ methodologies used widely
by internationally-active banking organizations, bank analysts and rating agencies. As defined,
NSFR =
Available amount of stable funding
Required amount of stable funding
≥ 100%.
This metric establishes a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the
liquidity characteristics of an institution’s assets and activities over a one year horizon. In
particular, the NSFR standard is structured to ensure that long term assets are funded with
at least a minimum amount of stable liabilities in relation to their liquidity risk profiles. The
NSFR aims to limit over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding during times of buoyant
market liquidity and encourage better assessment of liquidity risk across all on- and off-balance
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sheet items. In addition, the NSFR approach offsets incentives for institutions to fund their
stock of liquid assets with short-term funds that mature just outside the 30-day horizon for
that standard.
Table 5 sets out the NSFR’s composition according to BCBS 1 . Even though BCBS 1
imposes weights for each funding category according to the remaining period to maturity, it
failed to clarify the contractual maturity of long-term funding. Therefore, even a part of on-
demand deposits can also be considered as available stable funding. Besides, it gives too much
weight for funding within less than one year to maturity. For instance, the Basel Committee
does not explain why it assumes 90% of 1 year stable deposits as availalbe funding.
Table 5: Weights imposed under the Basel Committee’s net stable funding ratio
Available amount of stable funding Weight
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 100%
Preferred stock due in 1 year1 100%
Debts securities due in more than 1 year 100%
Liabilities due in more than 1 year 100%
Stable deposits due in 1 year 90%
Less stable deposits due in 1 year 80%
Unsecured wholesale funding or term deposits due in 1 year 50%
Required amount of stable funding Weight
Government debt securities 5%
Unencumbered corporate bonds rated over AA- 20%
Unencumbered corporate bonds/loans due in 1 year 50%
Unencumbered residential mortgages 65%
Retail loans due in 1 year 85%
Other assets due in more than 1 year2 100%
Note: 1: Preferred stock excludes Tier 2 capital. 2: Other assets exclude cash and interbank loans.
Source: BCBS 1 .
3 Data Description
Since all listed EU companies have been required to use International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) rather than local Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) since
2005, it does not any make sense to use pre-2005 bank data. In order to compare consistent
accounting information, we therefore estimate UK banks’ liquidity positions from 2005 to 2010
under IFRS. Most of the primary accounting data was obtained from the Bankscope database,
but some secondary data and contractual maturities information was collected from the banks’
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annual financial reports.
Because of the limited availability of bank data, we finally chose to focus on 8 banks out
of 121 banks incorporated in the UK and authorized by the FSA 26 , namely Barclays Bank plc
(Barclays), Bank of Scotland (BOS), HSBC Bank plc (HSBC), Lloyds TSB Bank plc (Lloyds
TSB), National Westminster Bank plc (Natwest), The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS),
Santander UK plc (Santander UK) and Standard Chartered plc (Standard Chartered). These
banks accounted for 88% of the total assets of the UK banking sector in 2010.
Since much of the current literature focuses on measuring US banks’ liquidity risk, using
accounts based on GAAP, we need to make appropriate adjustments to reflect UK banks’ use
of IFRS accounting principles. There are two significant differences relating to recognizing and
calculating the assets and liabilities under GAAP and IFRS accounting policies which might
change the calculation of a bank’s short long-term liquidity position27.
The first difference relates to the treatment of derivatives and hedging accounting. Under
GAAP, derivatives are treated like other assets or other liabilities, as ‘balances arising from
off-balance-sheet financial instruments’. Furthermore, before 2004, derivatives were classified
as trading or non-trading. Trading derivatives were reported at market value in the balance
sheet, with movements in market value recognized immediately in the income statement. Non-
trading derivatives, which were transacted for hedging and risk management purposes, were
accounted for on an accruals basis in the balance sheet. However, under IFRS, all derivatives
are recognized at ‘fair value’ in the balance sheet as assets or liabilities.
The second difference concerns the classification and measurement of financial instruments.
Under GAAP, financial instruments are classified into three items, namely Treasury bills, debt
securities, and equity shares. Each item is measured according to the different purpose for
which it is held. Trading instruments are allocated to a trading book, and are carried at fair
value; while non-trading instruments are allocated to a banking book, and are carried at cost.
Under IFRS, all the financial assets are treated as being held for trading purposes and are
measured at ‘fair value’. Table 6 is our stylized contractual maturity balance sheet under
IFRS accounting standards.
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Table 6: UK Banks’ Balance Sheets Under IFRS
On < 3 3-6 6 mon- 1-5 5-10 > 10 Total
demand months months 1 year years years years
Assets
Cash and balances at central banks
Items in the course of collection from other banks
Trading portfolio assets
Financial assets designated at fair value
Derivative financial instruments
Net loans
Reverse repurchase agreements and secured lending
Available-for-sale financial investments
Other financial assets
Equity investments
Intangible assets
Fixed assets
Other assets
Liabilities
Deposits from banks
Items in the course of collection from other banks
Customer accounts
Trading portfolio liabilities
Financial liabilities designated at fair value
Derivative financial instruments
Senior debt securities in issue
Subordinated liabilities
Reverse repurchase agreements and secured borrowing
Other financial liabilities
Equity reconciliation
Equity
Hybrid capital securities accounted for as equity
Other adjustments
Published equity
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4 Methodology
A severe liquidity event affecting a bank usually lasts between two weeks and three months5.
In a severe crisis that is resolved, one way or an other, within days, liquidity risk managers
generally only have access to stand-by liquidity held on the balance sheet at the start of the
problem. However, a liquidity crisis with both an idiosyncratic impact and market-wide impact
might endure for several years. The latest global banking liquidity crisis started in the summer
of 2007 because of the United States’ sub-prime mortgage problem, and lasted until the end of
2009. In these types of environment, liquidity needs are not related to instantaneous shocks;
instead, they develop in stages. Moreover, the stages can drag on for a year or more. Therefore,
holding enough liquidity to buy sufficient time to access contingent sources is critical.
Our short-term liquidity framework is built to measure whether a bank’s liquid assets
can cover its cash outflow for up to one year or not. A short-term illiquid position suggests
that the bank might face a potential liquidity event during the year and that it should try
to maximize the value of its assets portfolio and make necessary adjustment to its short-term
liability portfolio, such as rolling over deposits of less than one year to maturity. Our long-term
liquidity framework is built to measure whether a bank’s long-term funding due to mature in
more than a year can cover its illiquid assets and securities or not. A long-term illiquid position
suggests that the bank’s funding capacity might be insufficient if the liquidity crisis lasts for
longer than one year. In such a scenario, the bank should adjust its business model by, for
example, switching dependence on wholesale short-term funding to secured long-term funding,
and considering its own funding capacity before making new loans.
In this paper, we establish a quantitative balance sheet liquidity framework to measure
a UK bank’s liquidity risk by considering the real contractual maturities of its assets and
liabilities, which has not been undertaken in previous studies.
4.1 Liquidity Coverage
As we are seeking to estimate one year short-term liquidity coverage, only the values of assets
and liabilities maturing within one year are considered. Unlike Fitch 21 and BCBS 1 , therefore,
we argue that government securities and trading assets with residual maturities in excess of
one year cannot be considered as high-quality liquid assets. The one year liquidity coverage
ratio we focus on is thus defined as follows:
LCR =
Stock of high-quality liquid assets within one year to maturity
Total net cash outflows over the next year
.
If the ratio is over 100%, then the bank is deemed liquid in the short-term.
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The stock of high-quality liquid assets within one year to maturity is taken to include cash
and deposits with central banks, items in the course of collection from other banks, trading
portfolio assets at fair value, financial assets designated at fair value, derivative cash flow and
repos. Since an available-for-sale security is a debt or equity security that is purchased with the
intent of selling before its maturity date, the major part of these securities is liquid in capital
markets. Therefore, we impose the assumed weights by Moody’s 2 to calculate the value of
liquid available-for-sale securities. The short-term cash outflows are assumed to arise from
interbank deposits, stable retail deposits, other deposits, trading portfolio liabilities, financial
liabilities designated at fair value, derivative cash flow, senior debt, subordinated debt, other
financial liabilities and repos.
For valuation purposes, we firstly assume that no other asset sales or early-maturing assets
can be used to cover short-term cash outflows and that all of the assets and liabilities are in
the same maturity ladders. Secondly, we assume that the value of the stock of high-quality
liquid assets under normal circumstance would not be discounted, although the value would
be compromised under stress scenarios. Table 7 sets out both the normal and stress weights
imposed on high-quality liquid assets. According to the disclosure requirements of IFRS28, an
entity has to classify its financial instruments held at fair value according to a hierarchy that
reflects the significance of observable market inputs. The fair value hierarchy introduces three
levels of inputs. The level 1 assets are considered as very liquid assets, while the level 3 assets
are considered as illiquid assets. The level 1 liabilities are considered as very stable liabilities,
while the level 3 liabilities are considered as the most unstable liabilities. Therefore, under
stress scenarios, the value of the stock of high-quality liquid assets would be compromised and
level 3 assets would no longer be considered as high-quality liquid assets. As mentioned earlier,
BCBS 1 uses a 85% weight for less liquid assets; we also use the same weight to measure the
stress value of less liquid financial instruments held at fair value. The stress weight of the
available-for-sale portfolio is 85% of its normal weight29 .
We apply the same weights as the BCBS 1 for each liability with a remaining maturity
from 3 months up to 1 year to measure cash outflows during a liquidity stress year30. But we
assume it is difficult to roll over on-demand deposits and the most unstable financial liabilities
in a short time period; here, the weight should be 100%.
4.2 Net Cash Capital
Bank long term funding capacity depends on the availability of the liquidity sources to satisfy
the budget constraint over respective period of time31. Therefore, long-term debt with short
maturity dates cannot be considered as long-term stable funding to cover sticky assets with
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Table 7: Weights imposed under the short-term liquidity framework
Normal
Weights
Stress
Weights
Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Cash and deposits with central banks 100% 100%
Items in course of collection from other banks 100% 100%
Trading portfolio assets at fair value due in 1 year 100%
Trading portfolio assets at fair value due in 1 year (level 1) 100%
Trading portfolio assets at fair value due in 1 year (level 2) 85%
Financial assets designated at fair value due in 1 year 100%
Financial assets designated at fair value due in 1 year(level 1) 100%
Financial assets designated at fair value due in 1 year(level 2) 85%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year 100%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year (level 1) 100%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year (level 2) 85%
Treasury and other Bills 98% 83%
Debt securities without government sponsorship 0% 0%
Debt securities with government sponsorship 90% 77%
Other Debt securities, including foreign debt 67% 57%
Equity securities 85% 72%
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% 100%
Cash outflow over next 1 year Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100%
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50%
Stable retail deposits (on demand) 100%
Stable retail deposits due in 1 year 5%
Other less stable deposits (on demand) 100%
Other less stable deposits due in 1 year 10%
Trading portfolio liabilities (level 1 ) 10%
Trading portfolio liabilities (level 2 ) 75%
Trading portfolio liabilities (level 3 ) 100%
Financial liabilities designated at fair value due in 1 year (level1 ) 10%
Financial liabilities designated at fair value due in 1 year (level 2 ) 75%
Financial liabilities designated at fair value due in 1 year (level 3 ) 100%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year (level 1) 10%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year (level 2) 75%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year (level 3) 100%
Senior debt due in 1 year 10%
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25%
Other financial liabilities designated at fair value due in 1 year 25%
Repos (and security lending) 10%
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more than one year to maturity. As Raffis 25 mentions, some of the stable deposits at least
should have a contractual maturity in excess of one year. Therefore, long-term funding in our
analysis only includes liabilities with contractual maturity in excess of one year. The long-term
net cash capital ratio we use is therefore defined as follows:
NCCR =
Long-term Funding
Total Illiquid Assets + Total Illiquid Securities
.
If the ratio is over 100%, then the bank is deemed liquid in the long-term.
The long-term funding due in more than a year is taken to include deposits by banks,
customer deposits, financial liabilities designated at fair value, derivative cash flow, senior debt
securities, subordinated debt, other funding, equity and hybrid capital securities accounted for
as equity.
Some financial instruments that are held neither for trading nor sale should also be con-
sidered as illiquid assets, since they might be unable to generate cash inflow until the end
of their maturity. Therefore, different from Moody’s 2 , we include held-to-hedge derivatives
and other held-to-maturity financial investments as illiquid assets as well. The illiquid assets
include net loans32, equity investments, non-trading derivative financial instruments, other
real estate-owned, intangible assets, fixed assets, other assets and held-to-maturity financial
investments.
The illiquid securities from available-for-sale accounts are taken to include Treasury and
other bills, debt securities, and equity securities. Moody’s 2 argues that the weights on
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other asset-backed securities (ABS) without govern-
ment sponsorship should be higher (i.e. subject to higher haircuts) than those of other debt
securities because of the higher default risk of such MBS and ABS. So the weight for MBS
or ABS without government sponsorship is set by them at 100%, compared with the weight
of MBS with government sponsorship of 10%, and the weight of other debt securities of 33%.
However, it is difficult to obtain accurate imformation on the composition of each bank’s MBS
or ABS from current information. We therefore assume the normal weight of all debt securities
without government sponsorship is 100%, the normal weight of debt securities with govern-
ment sponshorship is 10%, and the normal weight of other debt securities is 33%. Therefore,
our estimated value of illiquid securities would be higher than Moody’s 2 . The stress weights
of illiquid securities are 1 minus the stress weights of liquid securities listed in Table 7. The
normal and stress weights imposed under this long-term liqudiity framework are presented in
Table 8.
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Table 8: Weights imposed under the long-term liquidity framework
Normal
Weights
Stress
Weights
Long-term Funding
Deposits by banks due in more than 1 year 100%
Customer deposits due in more than 1 year 100%
Financial liabilities designated at fair value due after 1 year 100%
Derivative cash flow due in more than 1 year 100%
Senior debt due in more than 1 year 100%
Other funding due in more than 1 year 100%
Subordinated debt due in more than 1 year 100%
Equity 100%
Hybrid capital securities accounted for as equity 100%
Total Illiquid Assets
Net loans 100%
(Residential mortgages)1 -80%
Equity investments 100%
Held-to-hedge financial instruments 100%
Held-to-maturity financial instruments 100%
Investment in property 100%
Intangible assets 100%
Fixed assets 100%
Other assets 100%
Total Illiquid Securities
Treasury and other Bills 2% 17%
Debt securities without government sponsorship 100% 100%
Debt securities with government sponsorship 10% 23%
Other debt securities, including foreign debt 33% 43%
Equity securities 15% 28%
Note: 1: The net loans should exclude 80% of residential mortgages because of their marketability.
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5 Results33
5.1 Liquidity Coverage
Barclays Bank was the only bank posting healthy short-term liquidity positions throughout
the six-year period. HSBC Bank also remained liquid, in both normal conditions and stress
scenarios, but not in 2008 and 2010. However, the other six banks, Bank of Scotland, Lloyds
TSB, Natwest, RBS, Santander UK and Standard Chartered, failed to maintain adequate
short-term liquidity positions under either normal or stress conditions in hardly any of the
years (see Tables 9 and 10 and Figure1)!
Barclays Bank’s ‘success’ was due to holding billions in cash with central banks and in
loans from other banks and engaging in repos. Since these assets are highly liquid, the value of
them would not be compromised even under stress circumstances. The bank also continuously
held stable liquid financial assets in its trading portfolio, as well as in the form of financial
assets designated at fair value, and derivatives. Meanwhile, the bank’s cash outflows were well
diversified, with the biggest exposures being due to on-demand stable retail deposits which
typically amounted to 30% or so of total cash outflows, and to level 2 derivative cash outflow.
Because of only a tiny dependence on those liabilities with 100% cash outflow weight,
HSBC’s total cash outflows were very limited, helping it to remain liquid in normal conditions,
expect in 2008, the year the UK economy faced a steep recession. The positive stress liquidity
coverage in 2009 resulted from large cash holdings with central banks34. However, under stress
scenarios, HSBC turned out to be illiquid in both 2008 and 2010. This was mainly because
HSBC significantly increased its dependence on short-term trading portfolio liabilities and
derivatives in those two years, which generated significant cash outflow.
The Bank of Scotland, meanwhile, failed to hold enough high-quality liquid financial assets
to cover the total cash outflows, resulting in illiquidity in all years under both normal and stress
conditions. Moreover, the bank was over-dependent on deposit funding, which, on average,
accounted for around 74% of total cash outflows. After 2007, the average liquidity coverage
ratio was only 67% of that recorded between 2005 and 2006, largely because of the large
increase in the bank’s retail deposit holdings.
As for Lloyds TSB, the bank’s total liquid assets rarely exceeded half of its total cash
outflow. As a result, it too remained illiquid throughout the period, in both normal and
stress years. Moreover, the bank over-concentrated its liabilities on on-demand deposits which
contributed, on average, around 73% of total cash outflows.
The average value of Natwest’s high-quality liquid assets in the six-year period was limited
to just under £6 billion, which represented around 10% of its average cash outflows in the same
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period. As a result, the bank also remained illiuqid throughout the sample period, under both
normal and stress conditions, posting by far the lowest LCRs. The bank’s failure to hold any
items in the course of collection from other banks, trading portfolio assets, or financial assets
designated at fair value contributed to its poor performance.
RBS also experienced severe short-term liquidity problems throughout the sampled period.
In 2010, for instance, its total cash outflows were £548 billion but the total normal value of
liquid assets was just £150 billion. Moreover, total deposits were 3 times as much as the bank’s
total high quality liquid assets. And its total deposits contributed around 83% of its total cash
outflow.
Santander UK Plc has not held significant amounts of investment securities for a long
time, resulting in its total liquid assets being, on average, only half of its total cash outflows.
Moreover, the bank has been over-dependent on the most unstable liabilities. Its on-demand
retail deposits contributed some 51% of total cash outflows, on average. As a result , the bank
proved illiquid throughout the sample period, under both normal and stress condition.
Finally, Standard Chartered had roughly the size of cash outflows as HSBC Bank, but its
size of high-quality liquid assets was, on average, less than 31% of the size of HSBC’s. Thus,
its liquid assets could not even cover cash outflow from on-demand retail deposits in any of
the sample years, causing the bank to remain illiquid, in both normal and stess conditions,
throughout the sample period.
Table 9: UK banks’ normal LCRs1
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Barclays Bank Plc 108.75 132.50 128.45 131.17 139.52 161.12
Bank of Scotland 36.33 41.71 31.51 29.37 22.02 22.12
HSBC Bank Plc 161.43 147.96 122.79 98.50 129.57 103.82
Lloyds TSB 43.56 43.01 34.53 85.26 35.94 60.71
Natwest 2.45 2.30 2.58 3.36 2.08 17.94
RBS Bank Plc 13.14 11.39 9.75 25.60 20.40 27.30
Santander UK Plc 91.27 31.79 64.10 53.07 48.55 63.56
Standard Chartered 30.09 30.32 32.71 45.62 33.94 37.73
Notes: 1.The banks’ normal postions (in £bn.) are depicted in Figure 1.
5.2 Net Cash Capital
RBS’s long-term liquidity position dramatically improved from 2008. Between 2005 and 2007,
however, its average net cash capital was -£173bn and -£176bn in normal and stress conditions
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Table 10: UK banks’ stress LCR1
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Barclays Bank Plc 100.18 119.37 114.43 111.22 123.37 143.34
Bank of Scotland 31.02 35.63 26.94 24.40 18.70 18.76
HSBC Bank Plc 138.66 126.86 105.23 88.69 119.62 96.43
Lloyds TSB 37.25 36.81 29.71 76.24 33.54 56.05
Natwest 2.20 1.99 2.26 2.61 1.85 12.15
RBS Bank Plc 11.35 9.87 8.35 21.78 17.88 24.48
Santander UK Plc 77.71 27.07 54.61 45.52 42.34 58.33
Standard Chartered 26.42 26.41 28.44 39.88 29.99 33.84
Notes: 1.The banks’ stress positions (in £bn.) are depicted in Figure 1.
respectively, resulting in average NCCRs of 58.74% and 58.27% respectively (see Tables 11 and
12). The post 2008 improvement reflected increased funding from derivative trading, senior
debt issuance, and equity issuance. For example, the bank’s 2009 equity increased by £9bn
(20%) to £55.2bn.35 As a result, its total long-term funding could cover both illiquid assets
and securities, even under stressed conditions.
Santander UK Plc also posted healthy long-term liquidity positions, but not in 2009. Al-
though the bank’s illiquid assets and securities rose by only 4% between 2008 and 2009, the
size of its long-term funding shrank by 32%, causing the illiquidty. A 28% growth in long-term
funding in 2010 restored the bank’s healthy net cash capital position that year.
The other six banks, Barclays Bank, Bank of Scotland, HSBC, Lloyds TSB, Natwest and
Standard Chartered, all unfortunately failed to post any healthy long-term liquidity positions
in the sample period (see Tables 11 and 12 and Figure1), with Natwest again being by far
the worst performer (reporting a NCCR of only 29% in 2010, under both normal and stressed
conditions). Those banks’ long-term funding could not cover illiquid assets, let alone illiquid
securities. For instance, HSBC’s average illiquid assets were 3.58 times its average long-term
funding, and Natwest’s average illiquid assets were 3.26 times its average long-term funding.
And, during 2007 and 2008, Lloyds TSB’s long-term funding shrank sharply (by nearly 50%)
compared with its 2006 position while illiquid assets and securities continued to grow, causing
the record low NCCR figures for 2008.
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Table 11: UK banks’ normal NCCRs1
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Barclays Bank Plc 90.27 84.18 80.72 61.14 62.77 68.71
Bank of Scotland 78.49 70.35 80.18 73.05 75.11 82.90
HSBC Bank Plc 23.11 28.09 25.43 21.08 26.28 31.48
Lloyds TSB 94.80 97.61 38.96 38.44 66.97 91.38
Natwest 26.45 28.51 26.53 29.66 43.05 29.37
RBS Bank Plc 53.54 57.05 65.63 153.59 109.40 121.64
Santander UK Plc 209.82 212.56 374.12 150.09 98.52 122.14
Standard Chartered 49.53 47.84 53.03 55.69 47.98 48.64
Notes: 1.The banks’ normal positions (in £bn.) are depicted in Figure 1.
Table 12: UK banks’ stress NCCRs 1
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Barclays Bank Plc 88.07 82.29 79.26 59.92 61.39 66.92
Bank of Scotland 76.85 68.84 78.82 72.41 74.47 82.35
HSBC Bank Plc 22.63 27.48 24.84 20.41 25.58 30.45
Lloyds TSB 94.36 90.17 38.68 37.17 66.32 90.43
Natwest 26.39 28.55 26.46 29.57 42.95 29.31
RBS Bank Plc 52.94 56.59 65.29 152.78 108.31 120.29
Santander UK Plc 209.70 212.54 374.05 149.40 98.40 122.11
Standard Chartered 47.51 49.05 51.04 53.49 46.11 47.10
Notes: 1.The banks’ stress positions (in £bn.) are depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: UK Banks’ Liquidity Positions
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6 Summary and conclusions
Our balance sheet analysis, based on the work of BCBS 1 and Moody’s 2 , but modified to
account for recent market experience and to give greater recognition to the actual maturity
profiles of banks’ assets and liabilities, has demonstrated that the largest eight UK banks
have all suffered some liquidity strains since 2005. Our results show that only Barclays Bank
remained liquid on a short-term basis throughout the sample period (2005-2010); while the
HSBC Bank also proved liquid on a short-term basis, although not in 2008 and 2010. On a
long-term basis, RBS has remained liquid since 2008 after receiving government support; while
Santander UK also proved liquid, except in 2009. The other banks, especially Natwest, are
shown to have faced challenging conditions, on both a short-term and long-term basis, over
the sample period.
The balance sheet liquidity framework adopted not only provides straightforward liquidity
risk measurement, but also presents fundamental financial information to facilitate analysis of
banks’ business models and funding strategies. Risk managers, for example, could adjust their
liquidity risk management operations to secure more high-quality funding in accordance with
the limitations exposed by the quantitative analysis. Regulators, meanwhile, can see from our
analysis whether or not banks are adopting appropriate business models, and react accordingly.
While our approach, using updated weights to reflect recent market expericence, is some-
what superior to that recommended by Moody’s and the BCBS, the results are still highly
sensitive to the key assumed weights adopted within the analysis. Moreover, no single snap-
shot measure can ever fully capture all the mitigating activities that can be undertaken by
bank management to enhance liquidity in a crisis. By focusing on the gap between assets and
liabilities under different maturity ladders, the analysis fails to capture dynamic changes in
banks’ liquidity positions. Accordingly, we plan to develop a dynamic model to forecast UK
banks’ liquidity positions in future research.
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